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8. LAW
INTRODUCTION
The teaching of law at University level in the England has always had a rather 
peculiar place, compared both to law teaching in other European countries and to 
the study of other superficially comparable fields of practice and knowledge in the 
UK. Law as a serious field of University study in its own right only truly developed 
midway through the Twentieth Century. Prior to that time, legal study consisted of 
either the study of arcane fields such as Roman Law at older academic institutions, 
such as Oxford, or the study of law as a practical subject in order to qualify for the 
Bar or to become a practicing solicitor. In part, this reflected the peculiarly English 
notion that law was not a genuine field of knowledge or research. This notion was 
never shared in other European countries, where legal study and legal research had 
long been recognised as legitimate, autonomous, and indeed prestigious, fields of 
knowledge and study. The teaching of law as a serious, and indeed elite, subject 
at University emerged during the Twentieth Century, although many remnants of 
those  previous perceptions and practices remain. While law is now one of the most 
popular subjects to study at both undergraduate and postgraduate level at English 
Universities, there is no general consensus regarding the precise nature of legal 
learning, nor even what legal knowledge consists of.
There is permanent confusion regarding the link between legal study at University 
and legal practice, and there exists a rather complex relationship between the 
academic study of law and the additional stages of study which must be completed at 
postgraduate level in order to become a practising lawyer. In recent decades students 
���������������������������������������������������������������������������������
number of credits in a certain number of core areas of legal knowledge) have been 
exempt from an additional year of postgraduate study in order to then take the requisite 
courses and periods of training to become practising lawyers. Non-law graduates 
have generally been required to take an intensive one-year Graduate Diploma in 
Law before being able to do this. The English legal profession is therefore rather 
unusual in not restricting law graduates to its ranks. This has the effect of creating 
a rather conflicted relationship between University law teaching and the profession 
to which it has the most obvious link. While some see legal education as essentially 
������������������������������������� �������������� ������������������� ���� �����������
stage of legal education as a traditional area of scholarly endeavour, offering an 
interdisciplinary exploration of law in its social, philosophical, cultural, empirical 
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and critical dimensions. Currently, only around a third of law graduates in England 
and Wales go into legal practice. Most law degrees therefore seek to strike some kind 
of balance between these two dichotomous perspectives, and the QAA benchmark 
statement for law underlines the multidisciplinary nature of the area of study and a 
law degree’s status as separate to a professional qualification.
Legal teaching is however in permanent flux, largely due to this complex 
relationship with the profession, and despite its continued popularity among students 
and the employability of law graduates. Currently there are changes afoot to remove 
the notion of a Qualifying Law Degree and to make subtle changes to the form and 
ordering of the professional stage of education and training to become a solicitor. 
This may have the effect of bringing closer to the surface the deep lying dissonances 
between visions of legal education and teaching, as the Qualifying Law Degree and 
its requirements have generally had the effect of providing a stable core of legal 
education and teaching despite these latent, and sometimes explicit, differences in 
visions of legal education. Finally, legal education and law teaching has never fully 
resolved its complex relationship with academic legal research which is carried out 
in Universities.
While this picture might come across as one of chaos or confusion, it also creates 
a great deal of leeway for innovative approaches and a general embracing of new 
ideas and perspectives. The lack of a clear disciplinary epistemology means that law 
teaching takes on many forms and there can be great variance in learning outcomes 
and teaching methods between colleagues, modules and institutions. However, this 
same epistemic openness causes a great deal of insecurity which, on the whole, 
leads to conservatism in the teaching of law, both in terms of actual classroom and 
assessment practices and of programme design and aspiration.
PERSONAL CONTEXT
I have been teaching law at University level for seven years. This has involved 
teaching at all levels from introductory undergraduate and preparation modules to 
postgraduate instruction and doctoral supervision. Like many legal educators I was 
required, in the early part of my teaching career, to teach core modules which were 
slightly distant from my fields of research expertise and experience but which make 
�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������
meant that some of my early teaching consisted of fields such as property law, trusts, 
and contract law. However, from early on in my teaching experience, I had the chance 
to teach in areas more closely connected to my research, in particular jurisprudence 
(philosophy of law) and employment or labour law. These have continued to be my 
primary focus of teaching, whether at undergraduate or postgraduate level. I have 
also taught in the overlapping fields of moral and political philosophy, and social 
policy. Where this specialist teaching has been on undergraduate programmes, it 
has largely been at the end of a law degree, when students can choose optional or 
specialist modules. I was sometimes frustrated that students seemed to be embracing 
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some of the critical methods for effective legal study for the first time during my 
modules, whether because these had not been effectively presented to them earlier 
in their degree, or, more likely, because they had not been convinced of the utility of 
adopting them. This led me to volunteer to do more introductory teaching on early 
general modules within law degrees, introducing the basics of critical legal reasoning 
to first year law students. I have also taught in other European countries, where legal 
learning is often perceived quite differently in various ways, mostly in the field of 
European and comparative employment law. I currently teach Legal Ethics, EU law, 
and an introductory legal skills and sources module. I have extensive experience of 
management of law programmes and the design and validation of law degrees at 
different levels and with different focuses and target audiences. In 2014, I won the 
������������������������� ��������������������������� �������������� ����������������
policy and sit on the national committee of the Association of Law Teachers.
������������������������������������������������������������������ ��������������
legal field is labour law and social policy, in particular from a European perspective. 
I also have a research interest in legal education and its nature, which is linked to my 
third area of research, legal theory and the philosophy of law, in particular the nature 
of legal reasoning and its relationship with other forms of knowledge and learning. 
I have a slightly broader portfolio of research areas than is typical in law, although 
most legal research is, by definition, both interdisciplinary in a traditional sense, 
but also generally covers several putatively separate areas of law. My work, while 
ostensibly about employment law, covers aspects of constitutional law, international 
law, European law, contract law, political philosophy, and social theory.
HOW ARE DISCUSSIONS AROUND TEACHING FRAMED?
Legal education is, broadly speaking, traditionally broken into two parts, the academic 
and the vocational stage, with the former preceding the latter (see Figure 8.1). The 
��������� ������ ��� ���������� ��� ���� ��������������������� �������� �� ���������������
QAA guidance and academic self-regulation and/or autonomy. However, it is also 
de facto regulated by the notion of the Qualifying Law Degree (QLD), which is 
only awarded to students who have completed a certain number of credits in the 
����������������������������������������������� ������������������������������������
Statement’ by the regulators of the legal profession. Possession of such a degree 
allows students to proceed to the vocational stage of legal education, enabling them to 
qualify as practising barristers or solicitors. Non-law graduates may follow the same 
path by completing the one-year Graduate Diploma in Law (GDL) which covers 
the same core material. This process looks set to be disrupted due to the imminent 
introduction of centralised exams open to all graduates and the abandonment 
of both the QLD and the GDL for the purposes of the solicitor’s profession. The 
consequences of this envisaged change are not yet known, however, and do not 
fundamentally alter the significance of the academic/vocational dichotomy in legal 
education. The major impact of this situation is that there is a remarkable degree of 
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similarity in law degrees across institutions, despite the relatively ecumenical nature 
of the current and previous QAA benchmark statements. Almost all law degrees 
offered in England and Wales are QLDs, meaning that they share a great deal of core 
content. In terms of the academic stage, the lack of general agreement regarding the 
epistemology of legal knowledge and research means that much design and delivery 
of legal teaching is often influenced unknowingly or unreflectively by a series of 
contested values and aims. These generally inform both the content and the skills or 
methods which are taught to law students, whether at the level of the institution, the 
module or the individual instructor. In many cases, however, such values are rather 
inchoate at all of these levels, so there is often a lack of clarity regarding what the 
values underpinning legal education are.
While values are therefore crucial, it is sometimes very difficult to either articulate 
or identify them clearly for many teachers of law, even very accomplished ones. As 
�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������
for me, and I have a relatively stable and clear concept of the values which inform 
my own teaching. Firstly, I see law as a radically egalitarian practice, much like all 
�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������
���������������� ��������������������������������������������������������������������
This therefore involves a teaching method which is often quite challenging for 
students at first, but ultimately emancipatory if successful. The ultimate goal is to 
provide students with the deep methods and knowledge of scholarly perspectives 
on law which will allow them to respond proactively to questions and situations 
which have no clear answer to someone who is merely in possession of knowledge 
formed by rote learning. This is sometimes seen as a controversial notion in law, 
Figure 8.1. Regulative vs. instructional discourse in law
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due to the confusion between the authoritative aspirations of certainty and solemnity 
which the legal system projects in the world generally, which many law teachers 
and students assume should be replicated in the study of law and the production 
of legal scholarship. This is a grave error in my view, and is reflected in confused 
values and methods, ultimately resulting in an emasculated form of legal knowledge 
and method in frustrated and ill-equipped students. However, I recognise that there 
are many other equally valid forms of legal learning which are equally located in 
valid sets of values. These result in very different approaches to legal learning and 
teaching, perhaps reflecting other forms of legal scholarship and method, including 
sociological, historical, ethical and comparative approaches, among many others. 
My own values stem from a vision of how legal reasoning itself works, and the 
values I think this involves. Whatever the values the teacher or programme brings, 
this should have a deep impact on the way in which students encounter both the 
content and the methods of legal learning.
Ideally, this content and methodology is brought together in a series of assessments 
which test both at the same time. However, as the precise method of legal learning is 
rather contested and multifaceted, there is often a lack of clarity in the mind of students 
���������������������������������������������������������������������������������
critical skills to demonstrate legal reasoning in assessments. On a deeper level, in 
particular regarding overall programme design and broader questions of policy in 
legal education, there is a deep link between overarching views of legal knowledge 
and education and what the focus of a law degree should be. In recent years, a 
focus of empirical legal studies, socio-legal perspectives, and critical legal methods 
incorporating ideas from radical social theory and moral and political philosophy 
have come to dominate in many legal research milieux. Certain law programmes or 
individual modules have come to incorporate these changing research agendas into 
the content and focus of the law degree. Other programmes have tended to focus 
�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������
the nature of legal knowledge will lead therefore, often implicitly, to choices about 
the appropriate course content of a law degree or module.
However, the fact that there exists a second stage of legal education, means 
that many professional legal skills are taught at this second stage. This will often 
also involve a didactic approach to teaching professional legal ethics. The extent 
to which the academic stage of legal training should mimic, offer preparation for, 
or be distinguished from, the vocational stage remains a deep source of explicit, 
and implicit disagreement in higher education in law. In my own context, I seek to 
manage these tensions by bringing to the fore certain deep convictions of mine which 
relate to my vision of this dichotomy as fundamentally flawed: I seek to demonstrate 
���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������
upon an ability to engage in deep legal reasoning. This will often involve pushing 
legal questions to versions which the students are not able to answer at their stage of 
learning, simply to show that the practice of generating legal answers, even if one is 
solely concerned with a vocational approach to legal study, cannot be mastered by 
For use by the Author only | © 2018 Koninklijke Brill NV
L. MASON
110
rote learning. To some extent, this activity becomes one of trust between me and my 
students, where they are willing to follow me as I reason through a problem, or, in 
���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������
same with my suggestions and assistance.
HOW DO WE TEACH IN OUR DISCIPLINE?
Legal knowledge and reasoning cannot be clearly separated from other forms of 
learning or easily defined on its own terms (see Figure 8.2). Generally speaking 
however, professional or practical legal knowledge or learning is distinguished 
����� ����� ������ ������ ��� �������� ��� ��������������� �� ������������������ ������ ���
study in which the law, its content, function and social role are interrogated in an 
���������������� �������������������������������������������������������������������
tend to underline the focus on scholarly legal learning, bringing with them a certain 
prestige to this form of legal scholarship and study, due to its association with such 
institutions. Practice-based legal learning tends to focus on more practical tasks and 
less controversial applications of legal ideas in order to develop legal professionals. 
While this is the focus of the vocational stage of legal education, it also characterises 
��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������
Figure 8.2. Relating pedagogy and discipline in law
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post-92 institutions. The goal of this form of legal education is generally understood 
��� ������ ���� �������� ��� ���������� �������� ���� �������� ����� ���� ��������������
who can practice in the law from day one, rather than who possess deep, reflective 
understanding of the law and its function. This creates a complex relationship with 
that form of legal learning which is considered to possess prestige. Within the 
���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������
 possesses certain elements which overlap with scholarly legal learning, and there 
is traditionally quite a strong link between legal scholarship and the bar, bringing 
prestige to the latter, although solicitors are often far more highly paid.
HOW DO WE BALANCE TEACHING, RESEARCH AND PRACTICE?
There is a slightly more nuanced relationship between research and teaching in law 
��������������������������������������������������� ��������������������������������
academic institutions where the legal education provided seeks to mimic the forms 
of learning present within legal scholarship, there is a clear incentive structure based 
on research and research outputs for legal academics. These factors will tend to bring 
professional success and status, and clear promotion pathways are structured around 
the production of research. In these traditional universities, those people on research-
track academic pathways generally must be motivated by intrinsic factors rather than 
Figure 8.3. Research-teaching nexus in law
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institutional incentives to engage in excellent teaching practice. This picture would 
appear to be relatively similar to most other academic disciplines. However, with 
law, the picture is more complex. Firstly, a form of job security is provided by the 
large number of law students, thus requiring teaching in a large number of core and 
optional fields of legal study. This, combined with the lack of the very large amounts 
of research funding more typical in the natural and social sciences for empirical 
work, means that students provide a large proportion of the funding for university 
law departments, even in elite research institutions, thus changing the institutional 
attitude towards teaching slightly. More importantly, in newer Universities the focus 
is more squarely placed on teaching, with teaching-track research paths beginning to 
emerge with an equal level of esteem and prestige to research-track options. These 
career paths are now also emerging in older institutions.
There has also emerged, quite recently, a rather serious research focus on the 
theory and practice of legal education and training, which has begun to bridge the 
divide between research and teaching. Finally, the existence of the vocational stage 
of legal training means that many highly regarded law teachers and institutions do not 
engage in research at all, or at least very little, although these people and institutions 
often lack the prestige attached to those who engage in scholarly research. Within 
the law context, however, the Research Excellence Framework (REF) has slightly 
recalibrated many departments’ attitudes towards research, with its importance being 
recognised more widely within the discipline. Like in all disciplines, of course, any 
positive impact has been determined by the uses and misuses of the REF by those in 
management positions in law schools, who have often misunderstood many of the 
elements of REF, in particular in the way they relate to legal scholarship. The lack 
��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������
matter further. Due to my own personal perspectives on the nature of legal learning 
and reasoning, and the broadly theoretical nature of my own research, I do not see a 
��������������������������������������������������������������� ���������������������
to see myself as someone engaged in research-led teaching, which I often see as both 
vain and misguided. Instead, I see my teaching and research as stemming from core 
synergies related to my deep values and beliefs about legal scholarship, in particular 
the idea that legal knowledge ultimately stems from asking deep-lying theoretical 
and philosophical questions about the nature, aims and values of the law. As a result, 
the major tensions in my own work largely come to the management of the ultimate 
scarce resource: time. Earlier in my career, I would dedicate huge amounts of time 
to teaching, almost in the manner of writing small pieces of original, accessible 
scholarship for student audiences.
I think that this led to great success as a teacher, and also taught me to present 
scholarship in an entertaining and engaging way to peers. However, it was 
not sustainable as a long-term strategy for teaching or research, due to the time 
commitments. As a far more confident teacher now, I seek to plan lessons in a very 
different way, developing three or four key points, around which I improvise during 
the lecture or seminar. I primarily do this to ensure enough time is available for 
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research-related work, although it also creates a relaxed classroom atmosphere, 
which is conducive to pro-active student participation. As my research profile has 
grown, it has become easier to justify an insistence upon my research activities 
being valued by my department. However, I have found that the best way to balance 
these conflicts has been to remain very active at research events, presenting work 
as often as possible, and attending the presentation of others’ research. This has, 
psychologically and practically, given me the necessary impetus to become ever 
more prolific in my research. It has also meant that I always feel part of the research 
������������������������ �����������������������������������������������������������
colleagues to do the same thing, but also to see their students as junior scholarly 
colleagues, so that lectures are an extension of an academic’s scholarly endeavours. 
This requires additional effort, in the first instance, to get students to buy into this 
image of student as scholar rather than passive recipient of expertise. When it is 
successful, however, it has a positive impact on all facets of academic life.
HOW IS TEACHING REGULATED?
The regulatory environment for legal education is rather nuanced, but often has the 
(perhaps unintentional) effect of standardising legal education across the higher 
education sector (see Figure 8.4). Degrees in law are covered by the benchmark 
statement issued by the QAA. This document takes a rather ecumenical approach 
to the content and approaches possible within a law degree and specifies very 
clearly that university-level education in law does not  primarily serve the purpose of 
professional preparation for legal practice. As a consequence, there is a de jure level 
of academic autonomy in legal education in universities. Some Law Schools have, 
over the years, developed rather unique law programmes as a result, although many 
of these subsequently revert to a more standard form made up of a core of subjects and 
a wide range of optional modules which might contain all manner of less traditional 
areas of a legal study, covering social theory, empirical approaches, philosophy, 
literature, culture and so on. However, the general direction of law degrees over 
���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������
by the regulators of the legal profession (the Bar Standards Board, or BSB, and the 
Solicitors’ Regulatory Authority, or SRA) regarding what constitutes a Qualifying 
Law Degree (QLD). As discussed above, this sets out the minimum content and core 
material which must be covered for a law graduate to pass directly to the vocational 
stage of legal education. The existence of the QLD has had a curious impact on the 
content of law degrees and the approach taken to legal education more generally. 
While there is no obligation for Law Schools to ensure that their degrees in law 
be QLDs (indeed there do exist non-QLDs at a small number of institutions), the 
effect of the Joint Statement has been to standardise the content of law degrees to 
a large extent, often going far beyond the requirements of the QLD itself in this 
regard. The Joint Statement also regulates the core content of the one-year Graduate 
Diploma in Law (GDL) which non-law graduates must take to begin the vocational 
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stage of legal qualification. The content of the GDL is exceptionally uniform across 
providers. However, the GDL has also had the indirect effect of influencing many 
degree programmes in law in terms of their content and structuring, a curious and 
unintended outcome of regulation.
Currently, the BSB and SRA are moving away from this current model, and the 
latter has expressed a preference for a move away from the QLD and the GDL, 
instead introducing a centralised exam open to graduates in any subject covering 
some core areas of law. The precise form and impact of these changes are not yet 
known, but it is likely that there will be some disruption to the content and methods of 
legal education. The vocational stage itself is heavily regulated in terms of prescribed 
content and methods, and this will likely remain the case for the foreseeable future.
In terms of my own teaching, I tend to treat such regulation as a structuring 
device, in particular in terms of dictating content. However, due to my strong belief 
that all forms of legal knowledge rest upon deeper forms of reasoning and reflection, 
this regulation frustrates me slightly less than other colleagues who see it as more of 
a constraint. I do also share one core element of the regulatory framework, that is, 
that there is a core of legal areas of knowledge which are necessary for all students 
of law to master in order to think clearly about the law. Of course, I have my own 
Figure 8.4. Locus of control in law
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��������������������������������������������� ��������������������� ����������������
however there is a great deal of overlap. In this way, the presence of the direct and 
indirect forms of regulation do not seem to me to impact on my own teaching to 
the extent that perhaps they do in reality. One clear impact is the impetus which is 
sometimes placed on me to justify and explain to both colleagues and students why 
I advocate and practice certain forms of deep legal learning which are not, on the 
face of it, immediately necessary for the vocational training of a lawyer. In my case 
���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������
forms of deeper legal learning, and of seeking to make my classes genuinely fun 
and entertaining. In simple terms, my approach is to try and make scholarly learning 
�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������
������� ���������������������� ���������������� ������������������������������������
���������� �������������������������������������������������������������������������������
������� ������������������� ����������� �������������������������������������� ��� �����
in’ to my approach. In the early years of my career I was seen, to some extent, as a 
trendy older brother character. This form of deep complicity in my relationship with 
students is crucial to my teaching, and maintaining this is crucial to the success of 
my approach to teaching. In many ways, this is not a sustainable nor transferable 
approach to teaching, as it depends on personal charisma, and it does not fit easily, 
paradoxically, with many modern orthodoxies regarding enhancement or student-
focused approaches to learning.
������������������������������ �����������
Law teachers seem to me to be particularly susceptible to the high levels of stress 
and vulnerability which characterise the experiences of many educators in higher 
education (see Figure 8.5). It is difficult to pin down specific reasons which might 
explain this in a general way, although the highly reflective and theoretical nature of 
legal research might make law academics particularly sensitive to stress in general. 
The fact that legal education does not have an agreed core of method or epistemology 
might also explain a form of insecurity which exists among law teachers, as there 
is no obvious fall-back position in terms of learning outcomes and students might 
often appear unreceptive to attempts to teach things in an innovative way as they 
are equally unsure of learning outcomes beyond the reproduction of knowledge 
verbatim. Paradoxically, this lack of certainty regarding core methods or outcomes 
leads to a very conservative approach in teaching among many colleagues who adopt 
a highly didactic approach to communicating what they see as core content. On the 
other hand, lawyers are generally rather charismatic and effective communicators, 
meaning that the actual classroom experience is often a positive one for both student 
and teacher. In general however, it is my impression that the sources of frailty in 
legal education would seem to emerge from the general complex environment within 
which legal education takes place.
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This environment can be viewed as either a framework within which to 
operate or a series of obstacles which make life difficult for you as a teacher. 
This environment might include students’ attitudes and prior learning, 
institutional incentives and pressures, regulatory and curricular constraints, and 
so on. Whatever this environment consists of would seem to have little impact 
on certain core constants related to the nature of legal learning and education and 
professional standards and goals. A good legal education is always made up of a 
(variable) core of content and skills, which can be developed in conjunction with 
students. If this is successful, teacher and students feel as if a great deal has been 
achieved as concrete progress is often easily identified. Much frustration in legal 
education is down to dissonances, in particular between students and teachers, 
regarding learning outcomes and their complexity. Avoiding such dissonances and 
providing the charismatic championing of deep learning allows the avoidance of 
the emergence of frailties.
Figure 8.5. Overview of pedagogic frailty and resilience in law
For use by the Author only | © 2018 Koninklijke Brill NV
LAW
���
����������������������������� ����������
Like many academics, I never intended to go into either academia or teaching, but 
rather fell into both through my joy in learning and the emancipation it brought 
me. My early experiences in teaching were very successful, much to my surprise 
and delight. I realised very early on that I possessed certain notions of learning and 
teaching in my field which were not typical, although they struck me (and continue to 
strike me) as a relatively incontrovertible epistemology of my field. In simple terms, 
this involves a vision of legal reasoning and knowledge which necessarily involves 
deep theoretical interrogation of the philosophical foundations and social functions 
of law. However, it is also informed by an understanding of legal learning as being 
about developing the capacity to generate new and original legal accounts, rather 
than simply repeat derivative ones. A clear vision of learning and reasoning in my 
field, and an ability to communicate these, meant that I have quickly taken on roles 
connected to management and revision of academic programmes, which, in turn, has 
fed back into my teaching approach as one centred on ambitious learning outcomes. 
This has also sometimes caused difficulties as my teaching is sometimes seen by 
a small number of colleagues as atypical, unusual, or even peripheral to the core 
concerns of legal education, and as a consequence I have tended to proceed with 
caution in many contexts, wanting to ensure good relations with all colleagues. To 
the best of my knowledge, this perception of my approach boils down to a view that 
sees theoretical or critical viewpoints as somehow extraneous to the core aspects of 
�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������
in practice’. As I have tried to explain, I find these visions of legal learning and 
knowledge not only unfortunately but fundamentally self-contradictory, as what the 
����������������������������������������������������������������������������������
and other forms of inquiry.
It must also be said that I did not attend lectures when I was a student, with 
some notable exceptions, although I was a very diligent student in general. This has 
influenced my approach to teaching more than any other factor from my personal 
experience. My own career in teaching has confirmed what I often suspected when 
I was a student, that is, that many research-focused academics despise teaching, or 
at least that teaching which is not simply a didactic overview of their own research 
or pre-existing perspectives. As a consequence, when I first started teaching I was 
at pains to communicate both the joy and emancipation of knowledge acquisition, 
�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������
developed an approach to teaching which involved the development of a deep 
intellectual complicity with my students, sometimes even creating the impression 
that the secrets of our classes together would help them overcome the problems and 
deficiencies in other course. I have moved away from this approach as I have gained 
seniority and experience, for various reasons, but the use of the classroom as a space 
for a challenging but emancipatory space for the joy of (legal) learning remains one 
of my key approaches to the hours I spend in the classroom with my students. Much 
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difficulty in teaching emerges from colleagues actively or passively resisting good 
��������������������������������������������������������������������� ��������������
learning outcomes and more complex content. Much of my career has therefore been 
spent navigating this complex path, underlining how good teaching practices and 
academic rigour are synergistic rather than mutually antagonistic. In many ways, 
I have sought to achieve this by co-opting my students, in some sense, into the 
scholarly community, while seeking to convince them that this is the secret to also 
gaining core legal skills. In the context of my teaching, this has a certain coherence 
because of my core convictions regarding legal reasoning’s dependence on deeper 
forms of philosophical reasoning. This brings the student experience much closer 
to traditional scholarly work in my own teaching. I recognise, however, that many 
teachers of law do not have the training to engage in this form of teaching. This is 
problematic in itself from my perspective, as it can risk debasing legal education, 
and creating the damaging impression that such ambitious forms of legal learning are 
peripheral. One key ability, however, given the contested nature of law in particular, 
is to develop a broad canon or repertoire of perspectives to bring to teaching, rather 
than simply reflect your own theoretical or methodological perspectives in your 
teaching. This is a common error among early career academics, where they seek 
to communicate their own perspectives and methods in a rather transparent and 
inflexible manner to students, who do not respond positively as it comes across as 
simply another thing to learn, with no obvious general utility for them. This in turn 
often leads to disillusionment on the part of the academic, who responds by teaching 
����������������� ��������������������������������������������������������������������
their own approaches within a broader canon of theoretical and other perspectives 
which are presented in a relevant and empowering manner for students. I have seen 
many colleagues who have developed genuine hostility towards students because 
they have failed to show interest or engagement with perspectives which the lecturer 
has developed in his or her own research.
Locating oneself within a broader community of scholarship, which includes 
both other perspectives and the students themselves, and doing this in an accessible 
manner, seems to me to be a way to avoid this form of disillusionment. This is of 
course a taxing approach, as it involves the development of an entire new canon of 
approaches and a history of ideas on the part of the academic. I recognise that this is 
a demanding approach therefore; however, it seems that this is required should you 
want teaching to be rewarding. In the long-run, if done well, this should also help 
a young researcher locate his or her work within a far broader community of ideas, 
rather than simply within the confines of a niche of method and content.
CONCEPTUAL EXAPTATION
���������������������������������������������������������������������������������
there is doctrinal knowledge, connected to the content (often contested) of a 
particular area of law. Secondly, there is critical legal learning, which is connected to 
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the impact, function, role, future, history, or desirability of the law or its alternative 
��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������
legal knowledge to practical scenarios and a series of professional legal skills such 
��������������������������������������������������������������� �������������������
elements overlap in various ways, and there is some implicit disagreement about 
their interdependence.
DISCUSSION
���������������� ��������������� ������������� ������������������������� ����������������
that, despite its wild levels of popularity with students, it is always vulnerable to 
reform. Equally, having no core, it is epistemically open, meaning that legal 
learning incorporates methods and perspectives from other areas, such as sociology, 
philosophy, psychology and politics, with little difficulty. The consequences of this 
openness and vulnerability however are counterintuitive: there has been a remarkable 
������ ��� ��������������� ��� ������ ����������� ���� ���� ������� ��� ������ ��������� ����
continually expanded due to many of the factors which emerge in the concept maps 
here. Having a relatively clear understanding of this epistemic openness, I believe, 
makes me less susceptible to the frailties of legal education which I believe are quite 
widespread, although to some extent I believe that such matters are also linked to the 
psychological dispositions of the person in question, which are more a question of 
brute luck than anything else. One thing that emerges from the concept maps here is 
the importance of communicating, to colleagues and students, the learning outcomes 
and skills which a module or programme is seeking to develop, in order to avoid some 
of the problems which emerge as a consequence of the methodological promiscuity 
and uncertainty and the uneasy relationship with practice and vocational training.
PERSONAL ACTION PLANNING
This exercise has been a transformative one for me. I subsequently began a research 
project of my own concerning the underlying nature of legal learning among legal 
academics as a direct result of taking part in this project. I have also revisited the 
learning outcomes and their communication to students in all the modules which I have 
taken on since taking part in the project. One realisation which has emerged from 
������������������������������������������������������������������������������QAA 
benchmarking in law, in particular regarding the link between different skills and areas 
of knowledge which can be understood and linked in myriad ways. I have begun to try 
and think more deeply about the links between different types of legal knowledge and 
learning, rather than simply acknowledge their coexistence. With potentially dramatic 
changes to legal education and training seemingly just around the corner, I am hoping 
to play an influential role in the shaping of the future of legal education by underlining 
the importance of some of these aspects, and am currently planning an academic 
conference on the future of the law degree to explore these ideas further.
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�������������������
���� ������� ��� ����������� ��������� ��� ���� ��� ������� �������� ������ ���� ��� �����
a prominent theme in his narrative. The discourse of prestige is notable in two 
����������� ���������� ���� ����������� �������� ����� �������������� ���� ������ �������
education institutions; and the difference between different arms of professional 
legal practice, most notably that between barristers and solicitors. These two 
contexts are not mutually exclusive; evidence suggests that Oxbridge graduates 
are more likely than non-Oxbridge counterparts to gain pupillage as a barrister 
(Zimdars, 2011). Of the 12 UK Supreme Court Justices in 2015, all had been 
educated at a Russell Group University; 10 were Oxbridge graduates (Mountford-
Zimdars & Flood, 2016).
Luke identifies an interesting complexity in the branches of legal practice; whilst 
barristers are seen as occupying one of society’s most prestigious professions 
(Bottero, 2005), and are viewed as being of higher status than solicitors, due to 
the common self-employed nature of barristers, solicitors are often more highly 
paid. In many ways, then, motivation to become a barrister might be seen as 
more intrinsic than extrinsic in nature. However, a further motivational influence, 
���� ���������� ��������� ������ ��������������������� ������������� �������� �����
occupational decision-making. Notions of the prestige economy recognise that 
not all motivations are financial in nature; instead, some decisions can be driven 
by the likelihood of conferring intellectual status, professional legitimacy, and 
prestige (Blackmore & Kandiko, 2011). Just as in the practice of law, Blackmore 
and Kandiko assert that motivation in the academy does not fall into a neat 
intrinsic-extrinsic dichotomy; rather, the prestige economy can also be a source of 
motivation for academics.
Luke reflects on the relationship between legal practice and legal scholarship, 
identifying an academic and vocational dichotomy in legal education. Luke draws a 
clear link between legal scholarship and the bar, implying that prestige accompanies 
both the research/scholarship branch of academic legal practice, and the barrister 
branch of professional legal practice. It is through this lens that notions of prestige 
also apply to different types of higher education institutions; Luke speaks of post-
92 institutions as engaging in pedagogic practices that focus on practical training, 
rather than focusing on the more foundational, scholarly, legal reasoning. In contrast, 
Luke identifies the latter approach as being more prevalent in higher status, more 
������������������������������������������������������������������ �������������������
of legal reasoning. We see within the discussion of his teaching that this approach 
to legal education is not without its challenges, and that often has to explain to 
colleagues and students why he chooses to indoctrinate students in deep legal 
reasoning, rather than simply equipping them with the skills and knowledge needed 
to be a legal practitioner.
����������������������������������������������������������������������������������
reasoning and reflection’ enables him to remain true to his values, and we see many 
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instances of the ways in which his values drive his pedagogic decision-making. As 
well as Luke’s focus on the area of legal reasoning, we also see examples within his 
narrative of a desire to include students within a professional community. We can 
return here to notions of prestige; the hierarchical nature of the legal profession is 
often argued to be reflected in legal education (Kennedy, 1982), where students are 
seen as occupying the bottom rung of the ladder within an academic community. 
Within Luke’s practice, we see that he deliberately aims to draw students into 
this community. He speaks of putting students in situations where they may not 
necessarily know the answers to questions, in order to demonstrate the importance 
�������������������� ���������������������������������������������� ������ ������������
where they are willing to follow me as I reason through a problem’. This approach to 
teaching is far from conservative, there is considerable risk associated with exposing 
��������� ��� ����������������� ������ ��� ��� ���������� �������� �������� ����� �����������
is one of the reasons why legal reasoning is seen as a threshold concept (Finch & 
����������������� �����������������������������������������������������������������
Luke’s values enable him to push boundaries in his teaching practice. This might go 
some way to explaining his teaching excellence, given that:
Good teaching concentrates on the individual’s process of reasoning and 
argument, rather than paying attention to whether an answer is right or wrong 
(in the view of the professor). The professor is not an authorising judge – an 
external source of truth – but is a model for discourse to be imitated by the 
�������������������������������������������������������������������������
We also see evidence of an approach where Luke adopts a kind of apprenticeship 
model in his interaction with students, stating that he would advise junior colleagues 
�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������
of an academic’s scholarly endeavours’. Thus, rather than students being excluded 
from a professional community of practice, Luke’s approach deliberately draws 
����� ���� ����� ���������������� ����������������������� ���������������������������
practice:
A powerful community of practice for students in higher education is one 
which takes them seriously. From a pedagogic point of view, this means paying 
attention to their cognitive development, reasoning skills and critical insights, 
rather than expecting replication of the solutions and insights of hierarchically 
superior staff and “research stars”.
Returning to notions of prestige, it is notable that in terms of Luke’s scholarly 
excellence, as well as his specialism in legal reasoning, he occupies what we might 
see as a position of prestige within the academic legal community. However, he 
chooses to inculcate students into this professional role through his pedagogic 
practices, thus overcoming hierarchical barriers to students’ engagement with their 
disciplinary community.
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